Russia could lose key military bases in post-Assad Syria. Here are 3 potential scenarios for its presence.

Russia sortied its ships from the port of Tartus after the fall of the Assad regime it had backed. Here, a Russian naval officer saluted aboard a missile corvette in Tartus, Syria in 2019.

Syria has been central to Russian plans to project power across the Middle East — as evidenced by the recent signing of a 49-year lease for Syrian bases.

But after the ouster of the ally it propped up, Syrian President Bashar Assad, Russian officials face the likelihood its days in Syria are numbered.

“Russia’s certainly doing everything in its power to maintain a presence in Syria while preparing for the possibility that this is the end,” Ben Dubow, a nonresident senior fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told B-17.

Moscow is doing so by “not only leaving their ships out at sea but, according to [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s] official Telegram channel, disbursing weapons to local Alawite groups,” Dubow said. “Reaching out to the new leadership is both an act of desperation and an acceptance of the new reality.”

This is a look at the dimming options Russia now faces.

Reduced footprint

Shortly after Assad fled to Russia, a deal was reportedly reached with the interim authorities, led by the victorious Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham Islamist movement, guaranteeing the security of these bases, and the armed opposition presently has no plans to attack them. Still, it’s far from clear that the future leadership in Damascus is willing to tolerate a long-term Russian military presence.

For now, some Russian warships are anchored outside the Tartus base as a precaution, and there are other Russian military movements in Syria.

“There is quite a lot of military equipment that has been hastily withdrawn to the coastal region or is being withdrawn at the moment from various remote regions,” Anton Mardasov, a nonresident scholar with the Middle East Institute’s Syria program, told B-17. “So, the ships that are going to Syria from the Baltic Fleet and the military transport planes that are coming to Hmeimim may be taking out this excess equipment.”

Alongside its Tartus naval base, Russia also has a sizable airbase in Latakia named Hmeimim, which it has used as a launchpad to conduct airstrikes throughout Syria since intervening in the country’s bloody civil war in 2015.

“It may not be a question of a complete evacuation of the bases right now,” Mardasov said. “Rather, a new government, possibly appointed after March 2025, should issue a decree denouncing or legitimizing Damascus’ past treaty with Moscow.”

A bare minimum force in Syria would “deprive” Russia of its capacity to counter NATO on its southern flank, Mardasov said.

Renewed access

A Russian SU-24M jet fighter takes off from an airbase in Hmeimim, Syria in 2015. 

Russia signed an extendable 49-year lease agreement with Assad’s regime in 2017 for these bases, seemingly entrenching its forces in the Middle Eastern country for generations to come. The treaty even granted the Russian military legal immunity for its personnel in the country, meaning they would not be held accountable for killing Syrians.

“I can’t speak to whether the 2017 agreements are binding, but at this point, only Russia could enforce them, and there’s no sign they have the will or capacity to do so,” Dubow said. “If Damascus orders Russia to leave, Moscow would be hard-pressed to withstand a siege.”

Russia’s best hope may be to try to extend its access until new deals can be made with the new Syrian leaders. The offers will likely have to be very lucrative to win over a Syrian opposition inured to Russian airstrikes and ruthless mercenaries.

Russia would likely offer money and other economic incentives, such as discounted refined fuel products, in return for Syria’s new rulers tolerating its military presence.

But these would likely be short-term arrangements.

“In the long run, it is unlikely Russia’s use of the facilities can be preserved considering considerable antipathy to Russia among Syria’s new authorities after Russia’s years of support to the Assad regime,” said Matthew Orr, a Eurasia analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE.

Syria’s interim authorities could even benefit from a continued Russian presence in the short term, he said. That could counterbalance the US presence on the other side of the country and serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other powers.

Complete withdrawal

Russia’s choices are stark if it can’t reach a deal. It can try to guard bases in an uneasy stand-off with HTS-led forces, which comes with risks of its troops being harmed or captured and subjected to trials that would humiliate Russia. Or it can airlift out its forces and materiel.

Orr, the RANE analyst, doesn’t anticipate a hasty Russian withdrawal from Syria. Instead, Russia is probably preparing “for an orderly withdrawal from the facilities, likely after failed attempts to negotiate their preservation in the coming months,” Orr told B-17.

“Their loss would harm Russia’s power projection because they are crucial logistical points for Russian military operations in Africa, the Middle East, and Russia’s global naval operations, and Russia does not have immediately available alternatives to the facilities.”

Tartus remains Moscow’s only naval facility in the Mediterranean, making it vital for any extended Russian Navy deployment south of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits. Along with Hmeimim, it serves as a hub for supporting Russian military and mercenary deployments in Africa.

Moscow has had access to Tartus since the Soviet era in the 1970s. Furthermore, Russia invested in its expansion in the 2010s, making its potential loss all the more painful.

One alternative Russian port outside of Syria could be Tobruk in eastern Libya, which is controlled by the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. CEPA’s Dubow is skeptical that the Libyan port near Egypt could be any substitute.

“Tobruk would not come close to making up for Tartus and Latakia,” Dubow said. “It’s both smaller and much further from Russia. Even a significant reduction of Russian presence in Syria would immensely damage Russia’s power projection capacity.”

In this case, could Russia’s loss be Turkey’s gain? Turkey is close to the HTS-led coalition, but it too may lack the cachet to win permanent bases.

“The Turkish Navy doesn’t need the Tartus base, and the possibility will depend on security conditions on the ground, which are still unclear many months from now, so it doesn’t seem likely in the near term,” RANE’s Orr said.

“But in general, the Tartus port is something that if there is a unified government in Syria, they will definitely try to leverage for security and economic ties with a great power, or remove the base as part of geopolitical balancing between powers.”

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